The Big Chill? - The Likely Impact of Koontz on the Local Governments/Developer Relationship by Tappendorf, Julie A. & DiCanni, Matthew T.
Touro Law Review 
Volume 30 Number 2 Article 14 
June 2014 
The Big Chill? - The Likely Impact of Koontz on the Local 
Governments/Developer Relationship 
Julie A. Tappendorf 
Matthew T. DiCanni 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate 
Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tappendorf, Julie A. and DiCanni, Matthew T. (2014) "The Big Chill? - The Likely Impact of Koontz on the 
Local Governments/Developer Relationship," Touro Law Review: Vol. 30 : No. 2 , Article 14. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/14 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
 
455 
THE BIG CHILL? – THE LIKELY IMPACT OF KOONTZ ON 







The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has come to be 
regarded as an accepted and integral part of American constitutional 
law.1  However, it currently finds itself at the center of a controversy 
that may revolutionize the relationship between property owners, lo-
cal governments, and the federal judiciary.  This controversy involves 
development exactions, a rapidly changing area of property law that 
has been the subject of several landmark Supreme Court decisions 
over the past three decades.2  Once a relatively unknown tool used by 
a handful of local governments,3 exactions, in many ways, now de-
fine the relationship between property owners and local govern-
 
 Julie Tappendorf is a partner at the law firm of Ancel Glink Diamond Bush DiCianni & 
Krafthefer, P.C. in Chicago, Illinois, and an adjunct professor at the John Marshall Law 
School.  She has published on a variety of land use issues, including co-authoring the follow-
ing books: DAVID CALLIES, CECILY TALBERT BARCLAY & JULIE TAPPENDORF, DEVELOPMENT 
BY AGREEMENT: A TOOLKIT FOR LAND DEVELOPERS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (ABA Press 
2012), and DAVID CALLIES, DANIEL CURTIN & JULIE TAPPENDORF, BARGAINING FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, 
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS, VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES 
(ELI 2003).  Julie was an Executive Editor of Research for the University of Hawai’i Law 
Review. 
 Matthew DiCianni is an associate at Ancel Glink Diamond Bush DiCianni & Krafthefer, 
P.C. in Chicago, Illinois.  Matthew was the Senior Articles Editor for the Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Legislation. 
1 See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in 
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (stating that the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions “has been recognized for well over a century and appears in dozens of doctrinal 
contexts.”). 
2 See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 277, 278 
(2011) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s exactions jurisprudence has developed over the 
past three decades). 
3 See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 516, 518 
(2012) (stating that “leading up to the Great Depression, subdividing land required only a 
whim, a pen, and a map. . . . large landholders bore no responsibility for constructing public 
improvements needed to serve these subdivided lands.”). 
1
Tappendorf and DiCanni: The Big Chill?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
456 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
 
ments.4  This relationship took an abrupt turn at the end of the Su-
preme Court’s 2012 term when it decided Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Water Management District.5  This case, hailed as a major victory for 
developers and a setback for communities across the country,6 placed 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions into the center of contro-
versy. 
This article will explore the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions, showing how it has evolved in the context of land use and 
come to be the logical underpinning of controversial Supreme Court 
decisions regarding exactions.  Part I will explain the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions, providing a brief overview of its develop-
ment over the course of the past century.  Part II will then discuss 
how this doctrine has come to be the logical foundation on which the 
Supreme Court’s exactions jurisprudence rests.  Part III will discuss 
the Koontz decision and its impact on the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions.  In Part IV, we will shift our focus to the Koontz decision, 
and explain why it has been called by some commentators the worst 
takings decision in Supreme Court history.  Finally, in Part V, we 
will discuss how local governments should proceed in the post-
Koontz world. 
I. WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
CONDITIONS? 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, first articulated 
by the Lochner Court over a century ago,7 holds that the government 
may not condition the provision of a discretionary benefit (e.g., a 
permit, license, grant, contract, etc.) on a requirement that an individ-
ual surrender a constitutionally protected right.8  For example, the 
 
4 Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in A Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Con-
texts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 741 (2007). 
5 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
6 See Jonathan Stempel & Lawrence Hurley, U.S. top court backs Florida property owner 
in land-use case, REUTERS (June 25, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/0 
6/25/us-usa-court-property-idUSBRE95O0XM20130625 (stating “[i]n a victory for advo-
cates of private property rights, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Tuesday that governments 
may owe compensation to property owners who are denied permits to develop their land.”). 
7 See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 51 (1910); Pullman Co. v. 
Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 56, 70 (1910) (demonstrating the Supreme Court’s first 
use of the term “unconstitutional condition” in these cases decided in January 1910). 
8 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (explaining that “the unconstitutional conditions doctrine for-
2
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government cannot force a television station receiving public funds to 
refrain from endorsing a candidate for public office9 because then the 
constitutionally protected right (freedom of speech) would be imper-
missibly burdened by the government’s refusal to provide public 
funds to the television station.  The doctrine applies even if the gov-
ernment is authorized to withhold the benefit altogether.
 10  This doc-
trine is a reflection of the view that the government “may not do indi-
rectly what it cannot do directly.”11 
There is a continuum of the degree to which a “benefit” is a 
discretionary gift of the government, and when it is a constitutionally 
protected right.  For example, welfare is a discretionary benefit that 
the government is under no legal right to provide.12  The right to de-
velop property, on the other hand, is a constitutionally protected 
right,13 albeit one that can be regulated.14  Therefore, the degree to 
which a benefit is a fundamental right rather than an optional gift 
provided by the government dictates the degree to which the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions may be applied.15  The more the condi-
tion restricted is a fundamental right, the less the government may 
burden it.  The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has survived a 
number of ideological shifts on the Court16 and has become an ac-
 
bids burdening the Constitution’s enumerated rights by coercively withholding benefits from 
those who exercise them.”). 
9 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 381-82 (1984) (holding that Con-
gress may not require a public television station to refrain from engaging in editorializing as 
a condition for receiving public funds). 
10 Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 107 F.3d 1178, 1189 (6th Cir. 1997). 
11 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 
(1989). 
12 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (explaining that once the decision to 
provide welfare benefits has been made, the government may not deny the benefits for unfair 
reasons or through unfair procedures); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399, 410 
(1963) (finding that a state may not refuse to pay unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day 
Adventist who rejects a job that requires her to work on Saturdays). 
13 Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1989). 
14 Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 266 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (stating “simply because 
a private property owner is in a highly-regulated field, does not, by itself, mean that the 
owner has no reasonable investment-backed expectations in its ability to develop or other-
wise utilize its property.”). 
15 James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning 
and Other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 411 (2009). 
16 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachro-
nism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 
596 (1990) (recognizing that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions survived the radical 
changes of the New Deal, and reemerged under the Warren Court to protect personal liber-
3
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cepted and essential aspect of American constitutional law. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
CONDITIONS DOCTRINE IN LAND USE LAW:  NOLLAN, 
DOLAN, AND LINGLE 
While the Supreme Court continued to expand the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions throughout the twentieth century, it was 
not until the 1980s that it applied the doctrine to land use.  Since that 
time, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has become one of the 
hottest areas of property law,17 providing the logical underpinning for 
the Court’s exactions jurisprudence, which has redefined the relation-
ship between local governments and property owners. 
An exaction is a condition placed on land by the government18 
that requires a property owner seeking to develop his property to mit-
igate the negative impacts of the owner’s proposed development.19  
This often requires the developer to dedicate land for streets, side-
walks, or parks, or to pay money to offset the government’s cost of 
providing infrastructure like sewers, water pipes, and garbage collec-
tion.20  The use of exactions increased substantially during the 1970s 
and 1980s,21 and local governments increasingly demanded greater 
concessions from developers, which often bore little relationship to 
 
ties); see, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 
(1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
17 See Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings 
Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1513 (2006) (“In the last several decades, there has 
been a marked shift in local government financing away from the use of general revenue 
taxes and toward nontax revenue-raising devices such as exactions.”). 
18 Usually a local government imposes an exaction. 
19 See Kamaole Pointe Dev. LP v. Cnty. of Maui, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1369 (D. Haw. 
2008); see generally DAVID L. CALLIES, CECILY TALBERT BARCLAY & JULIE A. TAPPENDORF, 
DEVELOPMENT BY AGREEMENT: A TOOL KIT FOR LAND DEVELOPERS AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS (2012) (providing a general discussion of development exactions). 
20 These fees are known as monetary exactions. 
21 The use of exactions increased in the 1970s because municipal governments were in-
creasingly strained financially due to the burgeoning anti-tax movement, the rise of the anti-
growth movement, a reduction in federal contributions to local communities, and increased 
state and federal mandates requiring municipalities to increase their services.  See Mulvaney, 
Exactions for the Future, supra note 3, at 518 (“In the face of federal and state funding cuts 
to local governments in the 1970s and 1980s, developer-borne exactions looked more and 
more like an attractive option to the public and its elected representatives . . . .”); see also 
Ball & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 1524-28 (explaining the growth of exactions through the 
20th century). 
4
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the negative impacts of the development.22  This attracted the atten-
tion of the Supreme Court, and in 1987, the Court began to develop 
its exactions jurisprudence in Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.23 
A. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 
In Nollan, the plaintiffs sought to demolish their beachside 
house and replace it with a larger one.24  The California Coastal 
Commission agreed to these plans on the condition that the plaintiffs 
grant the public an easement across the beachfront portion of their 
property.25  The Commission justified this easement on the basis that 
“the new house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean,”26 
and would “burden the public’s ability to traverse to and along the 
shorefront.”27  The plaintiffs appealed this decision in state courts to 
no avail, but were able to obtain a writ of certiorari from the United 
States Supreme Court. 
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Takings 
Clause permitted the government to require an uncompensated con-
veyance from a property owner as a condition for a land use permit 
when the government otherwise would not be able to require this 
conveyance without paying just compensation.28  The Court’s answer 
was no, unless the government could show that the condition “sub-
stantially advance[s] legitimate state interests” and the condition did 
not “den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.”29  For 
purposes of the case, the Court assumed that the condition met this 
threshold requirement.30  It then focused on the lack of congruence 
between the easement demanded and the purposes articulated by the 
 
22 See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: 
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 201 (2006). 
23 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
24 Id. at 828. 
25 Id. at 829. 
26 Id. at 828. 
27 Id. at 829. 
28 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. 
29 Id. (alteration in original) (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).  The 
Court did not specifically state what would constitute substantially advancing state interests, 
but that a broad range of purposes and regulations would satisfy these requirements.  Agins, 
447 U.S. at 260-61. 
30 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836. 
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commission.31  The Court noted that the “lack of nexus between the 
[building] condition and the original purpose of the building re-
striction”32 was critical because “unless the permit condition serves 
the same governmental purpose as [a] development ban, the building 
restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an ‘out-and-out 
plan of extortion.’ ”33  Nollan, thus, established that an “essential 
nexus” must exist between a development condition and the amelio-
ration of a legitimate public problem arising from the development.34  
While this holding essentially stated that the right to develop property 
could not be impermissibly burdened by the government except in 
limited circumstances, conspicuously absent from the Court’s lan-
guage was any mention of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  
The Court clarified this absence in another landmark property rights 
case, Dolan v. City of Tigard.35 
B. Dolan v. City of Tigard 
In Dolan, the plaintiff sought to redevelop her property, and 
as a condition of this redevelopment, the city required her to build a 
walk/bike path that would extend across fifteen percent of her proper-
ty.36  The plaintiff contested this condition,37 but lost at all state court 
levels.38  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and 
expanded and clarified its holding in Nollan.  The Court explained 
that its holding in Nollan was an application of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine.39  When the government imposes an exaction, it 
burdens the property owner’s right to receive just compensation for 
the taking of property.40  The Court held that the government may not 
burden this right except in limited circumstances.  Specifically, in or-
der to impose an exaction, the government needed to show two 
things: 1) there must be an “essential nexus” between the exaction 
 
31 Id. at 837-39. 
32 Id. at 837. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
36 Id. at 377-80. 
37 Id. at 381. 
38 Id. at 382-83. 
39 Id. at 385. 
40 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
6
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and a legitimate state interest;41 and 2) there must be a “rough propor-
tionality” between this state interest and the exaction.42  If the gov-
ernment could not meet both of these conditions, then it impermissi-
bly burdened the property owner’s right to development, and the 
exaction was unconstitutional.43  In Dolan, the Court found that the 
second condition had not been satisfied, as the city did not prove that 
the proposed walk/bike path was necessary to offset the increased 
traffic caused by the development. 
Nollan and Dolan, thus, created a framework that allowed lo-
cal governments to continue to impose exactions but made it easier 
for a property owner to assert a takings claim.44 
C. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
In 2005, the Supreme Court further elevated the importance of 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc.45  In Lingle, the State of Hawai’i enacted a statute that limited the 
amount of rent an oil company could charge a dealer.46  The plaintiff, 
an oil company, sued the state, claiming that the statute effectuated a 
taking of its property.47  The district court granted summary judgment 
for the plaintiff, holding that the statute “fail[ed] to substantially ad-
vance a legitimate state interest, and as such, effect[ed] an unconstitu-
tional taking.”48  The district court came to this holding by relying 
upon language in Nollan, Dolan, and Agins that seemed to require 
that a valid taking “substantially advance” a legitimate state inter-
 
41 Id. at 386.  The Court devised the “essential nexus” requirement in Nollan, 483 U.S. at 
837. 
42 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (explaining that to determine rough proportionality, “[n]o 
precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individual-
ized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the im-
pact of the proposed development.”). 
43 Id. at 391. 
44 The Court has allowed property rights to be burdened to a greater extent than other con-
stitutional rights.  For example, the First Amendment would probably apply to a government 
policy that refused to allow permits to hold worship services in a church unless the parish-
ioners agreed to perform repair work on government property several miles away. 
45 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
46 Id. at 533. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 534 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (D. 
Haw. 1998)). 
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est.49  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding and its 
reliance upon this “substantially advance” language.50 
However, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, re-
buking its reliance on the “substantially advance” language.51  The 
Court unanimously held that despite statements it made in Nollan and 
Dolan, a court should not review whether the government’s action 
substantially advances a legitimate state interest.52  The Court ex-
plained that the legitimacy of governmental action is not a proper tak-
ings inquiry, as “the Takings Clause presupposes that the government 
has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”53  The “substantially 
advance” language, on the other hand, improperly focuses on the pol-
icy supporting the regulation,54 and not the essential takings question: 
whether a regulation is “functionally comparable to government ap-
propriation or invasion of private property.”55  The Court held that 
the constitutional underpinning of Nollan and Dolan is the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine,56 while it is the Due Process Clause for 
the “substantially advance” test.57  By repudiating the “substantially 
advances” language, Lingle broadened the rights of local govern-
ments to regulate land use, as the court would no longer inquire into 
the reasonableness of government action.  This decision clarified the 
Court’s exactions jurisprudence, but left one crucial question unre-
solved: Did Nollan and Dolan apply to monetary exactions?  The 
Court resolved this question in Koontz. 
III. KOONTZ: A REVOLUTION IN LAND USE LAW? 
Koontz v. St. Johns Water Management District was decided 
at the end of the Supreme Court’s 2012 term58 and was somewhat 
overshadowed by other landmark cases involving the validity of the 
 
49 Id. at 531-32. 
50 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536. 
51 Id. at 545. 
52 Id. at 542-45. 
53 Id. at 543. 
54 Id. at 542. 
55 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542. 
56 Id. at 547-48. 
57 Id. at 540. 
58 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586.  The case was decided on June 25, 2013. 
8
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preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act,59 the use of race in 
school admissions,60 and historic rulings on same-sex marriage.61  
While Koontz may not have received as much fanfare as those cases, 
it has potentially wider ranger implications. 
The case involved Coy A. Koontz, an owner of a 14.9-acre 
tract of Florida wetlands, who sought a permit from the St. Johns 
River Water Management District (“District”) to develop a 3.7 acre 
portion of his land.62  As a condition to this development, Koontz 
proposed giving “the District a conservation easement on [a] portion 
of his property.”63  The District rejected this initial proposal and 
countered with a proposal asking Koontz to either dedicate a larger 
conservation easement or hire contractors to improve another part of 
the District’s property.64  After receiving this counteroffer, Koontz 
dropped out of the negotiations and sued the District under a state law 
permitting property owners to recover money damages in the event of 
an unconstitutional taking.65  Koontz argued that the District’s de-
mands failed to meet the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionali-
ty” standards established in Nollan and Dolan.66  The trial and appel-
late courts held that the District’s demand failed the Nollan/Dolan 
tests and, therefore, constituted a taking.67  The Florida Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that Koontz did not have a claim for two rea-
sons.68  First, the court held that the Nollan/Dolan standard does not 
apply to the denial of a permit (as opposed to the approval).69  Sec-
ond, the court held that the Nollan/Dolan standard does not apply to a 
demand for the payment of money (a monetary exaction) and instead 
 
59 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
60 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
61 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652 (2013). 
62 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591-93. 
63 Id. at 2592-93. 
64 Id. at 2593. 
65 Id. (indicating that Koontz “argued that he was entitled to relief under FLA. STAT. § 
373.617(2), which allows owners to recover ‘monetary damages’ if a state agency’s action is 
‘an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking without just com-
pensation.’ ”). 
66 Id. at 2595-96. 
67 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
68 Id. 
69 Id.; see also St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 
2011). 
9
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only applies to a specific burden on a property interest.70 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Florida 
Supreme Court on both grounds.71  First, the Court unanimously held 
that the Nollan/Dolan standard does apply to the denial of a permit, 
and that Koontz could assert “a Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional condi-
tions violation.”72  The Justices agreed that refusing to grant a devel-
opment permit unless a property owner agreed to an unconstitutional 
condition was no different from granting the development permit on 
the condition that the property owner relinquish his constitutional 
right to just compensation.73  The Court noted that “[u]nder Nollan 
and Dolan the government may choose whether and how a permit 
applicant is required to mitigate the impacts of a proposed develop-
ment, but it may not leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to 
pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough pro-
portionality to those impacts.”74 
Addressing the argument that Koontz had lost no property 
and, therefore, could not assert a takings claim, the majority held that 
Koontz had indeed suffered a constitutional injury.75  This injury was 
not that the government took property without just compensation, but 
rather that by its making an “extortionate demand” on Koontz, it 
“impermissibly burden[ed] the right not to have property taken with-
out just compensation.”76  Thus, the government’s action ran afoul of 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.  This would have been 
true even if the benefit was one that the government “would have 
been entirely within its rights in denying.”77  The Court recognized 
that “land-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the type 
of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits be-
cause the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit that 
is worth far more than the property it would like to take.”78  This 
 
70 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594; St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 77 So. 3d at 1230. 
71 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594. 
72 Id. at 2594-97. 
73 Id. at 2595. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 2596. 
76 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 2594.  The Court explained: 
Our decisions in [Nollan/Dolan] reflect two realities of the permitting 
process.  The first is that land-use permit applicants are especially vul-
10
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could easily “pressure an owner into voluntarily giving up property 
for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise require just com-
pensation,”79 and, therefore, required that the heightened standards of 
Nollan/Dolan be applied to government rejection of a land use per-
mit. 
The second part of the Court’s holding bitterly divided it 5-4 
along ideological lines.  The Court held that a government’s demand 
for money from a land use permit applicant, known as a monetary 
exaction, must satisfy the Nollan/Dolan requirements.80  The majority 
explained that holding otherwise would allow the government to 
evade Nollan/Dolan by simply imposing monetary exactions on a 
property owner instead of requiring him to surrender property.81  
However, the majority noted that taxes are not takings, and therefore 
not subject to the Nollan/Dolan requirements.82  It dismissed the ar-
gument that the difficulty in distinguishing monetary exactions from 
taxes might lead to judicial review of all fees imposed by a munici-
pality, writing that “teasing out the difference between taxes and tak-
ings is more difficult in theory than in practice.”83  The Court then 
remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court to determine wheth-
er the District’s rejection of the land use permit was a Nollan/Dolan 
violation.84 
Justice Kagan, writing for the dissent, proclaimed that the 
Court would come to “rue” its decision.85  First, Kagan noted that in 
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,86 the Court held that “requiring a person 
 
nerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine prohibits because the government often has broad discretion to de-
ny a permit that is worth far more than the property it would like to take.  
By conditioning a building permit on the owner’s deeding over a public 
right-of-way, for example, the government can pressure an owner into 
voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would 
otherwise require just compensation. . . .  Extortionate demands of this 
sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation, and the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them. 
Id. at 2594-95. 
79 Id. at 2594. 
80 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598-2602. 
81 Id. at 2595. 
82 Id. at 2600. 
83 Id. at 2601. 
84 Id. at 2603. 
85 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
86 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
11
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to pay money to the government, or spend money on its behalf, [does 
not] constitute a taking.”87  Rather, a taking only occurs when the 
government impairs a “specific and identified propert[y] or property 
right.”88  Under this standard, a monetary exaction could never be a 
taking.  However, she explained that Nollan/Dolan only applies when 
the government has effectuated a taking.89  Therefore, Koontz’s sub-
jection of monetary exactions to the Nollan/Dolan requirements was 
inconsistent with Eastern Enterprises.  Justice Kagan blasted the ma-
jority for “run[ning] roughshod over Eastern Enterprises.”90 
Second, Kagan worried that the majority’s holding “threatens 
to subject a vast array of land-use regulations, applied daily in States 
and localities throughout the country, to heightened constitutional 
scrutiny.”91  She was particularly concerned about the ability of lower 
courts to distinguish monetary exactions, held to the higher Nol-
lan/Dolan standard, from taxes, not held to this standard.92  Kagan 
noted that “[t]he boundaries of the majority’s new rule are uncer-
tain.”93 
Third, Justice Kagan challenged the majority’s factual find-
ings.  She argued that the government never made a demand on 
Koontz.94  Rather, it merely engaged in a process of negotiation, sug-
gesting ways Koontz could mitigate the negative effects of his devel-
opment.95  Kagan noted that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to exces-
sive regulatory burdens on land use, but instead prevents the 
government from imposing the unconstitutional condition that a 
property owner surrender his right to “just compensation ‘in ex-
change for a discretionary benefit’ having ‘little or no relationship’ to 
the property taken.”96  “[Therefore], the Nollan/Dolan test only ap-
plies when the property the government demands . . . is the kind [for 
 
87 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2605 (Kagan, J., dissenting); E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 543 (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
88 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2605 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original); E. Enters., 
524 U.S. at 540-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
89 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2606 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. at 2603. 
91 Id. at 2604. 
92 Id. at 2607-08. 
93 Id. at 2604. 
94 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
95 Id. at 2611. 
96 Id. at 2604-05 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547). 
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which] it otherwise would have to pay. . . .”97  If the government nev-
er makes a demand, no taking could occur.98  Therefore, according to 
Justice Kagan, Koontz had no claim.99 
Fourth, Justice Kagan argued that challenges to monetary ex-
actions should be evaluated under the Penn Central regulatory tak-
ings framework or as a violation of another constitutional provision, 
like the Due Process Clause.100  As noted above, she explained that 
Nollan/Dolan only applies when the government imposes an exaction 
for which it otherwise would have to pay just compensation.101  As a 
result, the Takings Clause is not the appropriate constitutional provi-
sion to apply to monetary exactions. 
IV. KOONTZ: THE WORST TAKINGS DECISION OF ALL TIME? 
While the reception to the Koontz decision was initially 
mixed,102 the decision has engendered an increasingly critical re-
sponse.103  Scholars question the legal foundation on which it rests, 
developers worry about the chilling effects it will have on negotia-
tions with local governments, and local governments worry about the 
lawsuits they will face from developers.  Cumulatively, these issues 
 
97 Id. at 2605. 
98 Id. at 2604. 
99 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. at 2609.  Kagan argues that “a court can use the Penn Central framework, the Due 
Process Clause, and (in many places) state law to protect against monetary demands . . . .”  
Id. 
101 Id. 
102 A number of commentators praised the decision in the days after it was issued.  See 
Larry Salzman, Koontz Decision: Victory for Property Rights, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 25, 
2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/352016/koontz-decision-victory-
property-rights-larry-salzman; Paul J. Beard II, Ruling Protects Landowners But Won’t Hurt 
‘Collaboration’, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (July 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.sacbee.com/. 
2013/07/10/5556066/ruling-protects-landowners-but.html.  However, the decision was also 
criticized.  John D. Echeverria, A Legal Blow to Sustainable Development, N.Y. TIMES (June 
26, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/a-legal-blow-to-
sustainable-development.html?ref=opinion&_r=1&. 
103 See John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, VT. L. SCH. 
PAPER (Aug. 26, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316406; Adam Lovelady, The Koontz De-
cision and Implications for Development Exactions, COATES’ CANONS BLOG (July 1, 2013), 
http://canons.sog.unc.edu; Potential Impacts of Koontz Decision on Local Land Use Deci-
sions, CMAP (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.cmap.illinois.gov/about/updates/-/asset_publisher 
/UIMfSLnFfMB6/content/potential-impacts-of-koontz-decision-on-local-land-use-decisions. 
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might make Koontz the Supreme Court’s worst takings decision of all 
time. 
A. Koontz Rests on a Shaky Legal Foundation 
One major problem with the Court’s decision in Koontz is the 
shaky legal foundation upon which it rests.  The Court ignored past 
precedent and created an amorphous, ill-defined legal standard that 
lower courts will have difficulty applying.  First, as Justice Kagan 
notes in her dissent, the majority’s holding in Koontz “runs rough-
shod over Eastern Enterprises.”104  In that case, the Court held that 
requiring an individual to pay money to the government or spend 
money on its behalf did not constitute a taking to which the Nol-
lan/Dolan requirements would apply.105  This would seem to encom-
pass monetary exactions.  However, the majority in Koontz does not 
address the inconsistency between its holding and Eastern Enterpris-
es.  Its failure to resolve the discrepancy between these cases creates 
uncertainty as to when monetary exactions apply, and how Eastern 
Enterprises fits into the takings analysis. 
Second, Koontz contradicts the Court’s holding in City of 
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.106  In that case, a 
unanimous Court held that Dolan’s rough proportionality test does 
not apply to permit denials.107  The Court stated: 
Dolan considers whether dedications demanded as 
conditions of development are proportional to the de-
velopment’s anticipated impacts.  It was not designed 
to address, and is not readily applicable to, the much 
different questions arising where, as here, the land-
owner’s challenge is based not on excessive exactions 
but on denial of development.108 
Koontz squarely contradicts this statement by applying the Dolan 
rough proportionality test to permit denials.109  Amazingly, the major-
ity makes no mention of City of Monterey and leaves us wondering 
 
104 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
105 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
106 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
107 Id. at 703. 
108 Id. 
109 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95. 
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how to resolve the inconsistencies between these cases. 
While Koontz rides roughshod over established Supreme 
Court precedent, it leaves in its wake a murky legal standard that 
lower courts will find difficult to apply.  This murkiness will be most 
clear when a lower court attempts to determine when a permit denial 
should be held to the Nollan/Dolan requirements.  Koontz held that 
the Nollan/Dolan requirements will be triggered when a local gov-
ernment makes a demand on a permit applicant.110  However, what 
constitutes a demand?  Koontz gives no guidance.  The majority 
merely states in conclusory fashion that the District made a demand 
on Koontz.111  It does not explain why the District made a demand 
and not merely a proposal, or give any guidance for lower courts to 
distinguish between the two.  Justice Kagan struggles to find the line 
between them, and ultimately comes to an opposite conclusion from 
the majority, finding that the District merely made proposals, and not 
demands, on Koontz.112  The absence of any framework by which to 
distinguish a demand from a proposal means that lower courts will 
create their own framework, leading to a haphazard application of 
Koontz throughout the country.  Justice Kagan fears the consequences 
of the murky line between a demand and a proposal, writing that 
“[the] danger would rise exponentially if something less than a clear 
condition . . . triggered Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.”113 
This murky line between a demand and a proposal is further 
complicated by the realities of the permitting process.  Negotiations 
between developers and local government often consist of informal 
conversations and mutual understandings not documented in formal 
letters or contracts.  Several exaction options may be discussed, none 
of which were clearly defined or identified.  How does either side 
prove whether an unconstitutional demand was made?  It is difficult 
 
110 Id. at 2595. 
111 Id. at 2594-96. 
112 Id. at 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
113 Id. at 2610.  Justice Kagan worries about the inability of local governments and courts 
to distinguish a demand from a suggestion, noting: 
unless Nollan and Dolan are to wreck land-use permitting throughout the 
country—to the detriment of both communities and property owners—
that demand must be unequivocal.  If a local government risked a lawsuit 
every time it made a suggestion to an applicant about how to meet per-
mitting criteria, it would cease to do so; indeed, the government might 
desist altogether from communicating with applicants. 
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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enough for a court to determine whether an exaction imposed violates 
Nollan/Dolan.  However, when no exaction has been imposed, the 
challenge becomes ever more difficult. 
Furthermore, the majority strains the limits of the Nol-
lan/Dolan test by applying it to monetary exactions.  In both Nollan 
and Dolan, the Court stated that heightened review applied because 
the exactions demanded by the government would have constituted 
per se takings114 had they been assessed directly.115  Both cases sug-
gest that had the exactions not constituted per se takings, then it 
would have been inappropriate to impose the Court’s heightened re-
view.116  However, monetary exactions can never constitute a per se 
taking because they do not require a property owner to suffer a per-
manent physical invasion of his property, nor do they completely de-
prive an owner of all beneficial use of his property.117  Therefore, 
Nollan and Dolan were never meant to apply to monetary exactions.  
Justice Kagan recognizes this, writing that “[t]he majority offers no 
theory to . . . explain, as it must, why the District’s [monetary] condi-
tion was ‘unconstitutional.’ ”118 
B. Koontz Makes an Orderly System of Land Use 
Regulation Significantly More Difficult 
Conspicuously absent from the majority’s opinion in Koontz 
 
114 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.  The Court noted that there are “two categories of regula-
tory action that generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes.  
First, where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her 
property,” as in Loretto; and second, when a regulation “completely deprive[s] an owner of 
‘all economically beneficial us[e]’ of her property,” as in Lucas.  Id. at 538 (alteration in 
original). 
115 The exaction demanded in Nollan was a public easement along the property owner’s 
beachfront property.  The exaction demanded in Dolan was the walk/bike path along fifteen 
percent of the property owner’s land.  Both of these would constitute per se takings under 
the Loretto takings test.  See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-28; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80.  See 
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (discussing the Loretto takings test). 
116 Nollan and Dolan rest on the premise that heightened review is necessary because the 
constitutional right to just compensation is burdened by the taking of property.  See Nollan, 
483 U.S. at 838; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386.  Eastern Enterprises also suggests this.  Justice 
Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, wrote that “in all of the cases where the regulatory tak-
ing[s] analysis has been employed, a specific property right or interest has been at stake.”  E. 
Enters., 524 U.S. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
117 These are the two requirements for a per se taking.  See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (dis-
cussing the Loretto takings test). 
118 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2607 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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was any discussion regarding the practical effects of its decision on 
land use regulation.  One would expect a decision that rests on such a 
shaky legal foundation to at least make good policy, but this too is 
lacking in the Koontz decision. 
One of the most significant consequences of Koontz will be 
the changes it makes to the relationship between local governments 
and developers.  As part of the development process, local govern-
ments frequently meet with developers to discuss the potential nega-
tive impacts of development and how the developer might mitigate 
them.119  This type of collaboration is essential to an orderly and effi-
cient system of land use regulation.120  Unfortunately, Koontz serves 
as a major obstacle to this collaboration. 
Koontz makes it significantly easier for developers to drop out 
of negotiations and sue the local government over the allegedly “ex-
tortionate” demands that it has made during the permitting process.  
Koontz itself demonstrates all too clearly how this could happen.  
Koontz, upset with the District’s rejection of his development pro-
posal, broke off his negotiations with it and filed suit.121  The dissent 
points out that Koontz was in the early stages of the negotiation pro-
cess122 and that it is unclear whether the “extortionate demands” 
made by the District were in fact demands or merely nonbinding pro-
posals.123  In fact, the Court’s refusal to provide standards to distin-
guish between the two is a serious obstacle to collaboration between 
a local government and a developer. 
In the back-and-forth process of negotiations over land use 
permits, whenever the government makes a request that the developer 
does not like, the developer now has the option to drop out of the ne-
gotiations and bring a lawsuit against the government for making un-
constitutional demands.  In order to avoid this lawsuit, local govern-
ments will be reluctant to engage in any negotiations with 
 
119 Collaboration between land use owners and developers is an integral part of local gov-
ernment development guides.  See, e.g., Thomas P. DiNapoli, Office of the N.Y. State 
Comptroller, Shared Services in Local Government, LOCAL GOV’T MGMT GUIDE 3-9 (DEC. 
2009), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/lgmg/sharedservices.pdf. 
120 See Karalee Browne & Steve Sanders, Collaboration Promotes Economic Develop-
ment and Advances Sustainability, W. CITY (May 2013), http://www.westerncity.com/Weste 
rn-City/May-2013/Collaboration-Promotes-Economic-Development/. 
121 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
122 Id. at 2610-11 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
123 Id. 
17
Tappendorf and DiCanni: The Big Chill?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
472 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
 
developers.124  As Justice Kagan noted in her dissent, when faced 
with this situation, “no local government official with a decent law-
yer would have a conversation with a developer.”125  In order to avoid 
the lawsuits resulting from negotiations with developers, local gov-
ernments are more likely to either deny a permit outright or grant one 
without imposing any exactions.126  This is a suboptimal outcome for 
both sides. 
In addition to discouraging collaboration between developers 
and local governments, Koontz will make development more costly.  
As noted above, Koontz will almost certainly spawn more litigation 
between local governments and developers.127  Fights over develop-
ment, once waged in local zoning board hearings, will now take place 
in federal court, where it will be more expensive and time consum-
ing.  Furthermore, Koontz never resolved the issue as to when a local 
government’s exactions are “roughly proportional” to its demands.  
Litigation will surely arise to determine the boundaries of this stand-
ard. 
Another problem with the Koontz decision is that it takes 
power away from communities and puts it into the hands of federal 
judges.  As developers can now bypass zoning boards and contest a 
land use decision in federal court, federal judges, often unfamiliar 
with the land use negotiation process and unaware of local condi-
tions, will be making important land use decisions previously made 
by local zoning boards comprised of elected community representa-
tives.128 
Additionally, the majority in Koontz was concerned about lo-
cal governments extracting concessions from developers.  Yet, its 
 
124 Sacramento Bee Editorial Board, Court Ruling a Blow to Land Use Collaboration, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (June 27, 2013), blogs.sacbee.com/capitol-alert-insider-edition/2013/06/e 
ditorial-court-ruling-a-blow-to-land-use-collaboration.html.  See also Sean F. Nolan, Bar-
gaining for Development Post-Koontz: How the Supreme Court Invaded Local Government, 
VT. L. SCH. (discussing how the ruling in Koontz makes land use negotiations less efficient). 
125 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Justice Kagan worries about the 
consequences of the majority’s decision on collaboration between local governments and 
developers, noting that “[i]f a local government risked a lawsuit every time it made a sugges-
tion to an applicant about how to meet permitting criteria, it would cease to do so; indeed, 
the government might desist altogether from communicating with applicants.”  Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 2611-12. 
128 Id. at 2612 (“The majority turns a broad array of local land-use regulations into federal 
constitutional questions. . . .  [P]lac[ing] courts smack in the middle of the most everyday 
local government activity.”). 
18
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holding makes it easier for developers to extract concessions from lo-
cal governments.  Developers, who are generally multi-million dollar 
entities capable of providing the investment and infrastructure that 
are the lifeblood of communities,129 already carry significant leverage 
in their negotiations with local governments.130  Making it easier for 
them to bring a lawsuit against financially-strained local governments 
only increases their power at the bargaining table and their ability to 
extract concessions from communities. 
Furthermore, the majority’s casual dismissal of the difficulties 
involved in distinguishing a monetary exaction from a tax ignores the 
realities faced by local governments.  Is it really so easy to distin-
guish a monetary exaction levied in exchange for a building permit 
from a tax on all new houses to be built in a community?  As Justice 
Kagan notes, lower courts have been all over the map on “how to 
make the distinction”131 between an exaction and a property tax.  In 
fact, the majority’s inability to articulate a clear standard to distin-
guish the two shows the difficulty in doing so. 
Ultimately, Koontz creates a new paradigm in the relationship 
between local governments and developers.  Koontz gives developers 
special protections that local governments and taxpayers currently 
lack.  In this new world, local governments must avoid falling into 
traps that will subject them to litigation or allow developers the up-
per-hand in the negotiating process. 
V. HOW DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS PROCEED IN THE POST - 
KOONTZ WORLD? 
In the aftermath of Koontz, local governments must be extra-
cautious when negotiating with developers.  Specifically, they must 
avoid certain actions that may bring about a lawsuit. 
First, when negotiating with developers, local governments 
must make clear that their discussions are exploratory only, that no 
demands are being made, and that the city council or zoning board 
 
129 See Browne & Sanders, supra note 120 (“cities are working to attract business invest-
ments that will bring jobs, skilled workers and new tax revenue. . . .  [C]ompetition to attract 
employers can be fierce.”). 
130 See id. (“[C]ompetition between neighboring cities and counties [for developers] . . . 
pits communities against one another . . . .”).  This gives developers significant leverage in 
negotiations with cities. 
131 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2607- 08 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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are the only entities authorized to formally approve any conditions 
necessary to obtain a permit.  As explained above, it is unclear what 
constitutes a demand that might give rise to a Koontz-style takings 
claim.132  However, it should be clear that a takings claim cannot pro-
ceed until a demand is made.  By making it clear at the outset that 
any discussions with a developer are exploratory only and that no 
formal demands are being made, a local government may be able to 
prevent this type of lawsuit from being initiated.  Furthermore, a local 
government must carefully craft a record to show its negotiations 
were exploratory only and not formal demands. 
Second, local governments should make greater use of devel-
opment agreements.  A development agreement is a contract between 
a developer and a local government specifying the terms of the de-
velopment133 and can be beneficial for both parties.134  For example, a 
local government can specify the exactions it will require from the 
developer, while the developer can freeze zoning laws, obtain support 
during the development process, and streamline the approval of per-
mits.135  As part of the agreement, the developer and the local gov-
ernment can also immunize each other from liability during the nego-
tiation process. 
The use of a voluntary development agreement to set the 
terms and conditions of development of a particular property should 
reduce the likelihood of a Koontz challenge and help ensure a dia-
logue between a local government and a developer.  A number of 
states have statutes enabling local governments to enter into devel-
opment agreements,136 and courts have been willing to uphold 
 
132 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2494-96 (majority opinion) (stating that “[t]he Florida Su-
preme Court [was] puzzled over how the government’s demand for property can violate the 
Takings Clause . . . .”). 
133 Development Agreements in Plain English, MUN. RESEARCH & SERV. CTR. OF WASH., 
available at http://www.mrsc.org/subjects/planning/lu/developagreements.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2014); CALLIES, BARCLAY, & TAPPENDORF, supra note 19. 
134 For a detailed explanation of development agreements, see Development Agreements 
in Plain English, MUN. RESEARCH & SERV. CTR. OF WASH., available at 
http://www.mrsc.org/subjects/planning/lu/developagreements.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 
2014), and DAVID L. CALLIES, DANIEL J. CURTIN, & JULIE A. TAPPENDORF, BARGAINING FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, 
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS, VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES 
(2003). 
135 See Brad K. Schwartz, Development Agreements: Contracting for Vested Rights, 28 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 719, 726-27 (2001). 
136 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.05; CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65864-65869; COLO. 
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them.137  However, a local government must avoid mandating the use 
of these agreements.  While development agreements can be an effec-
tive way to ensure that development in fact occurs and is done fairly, 
any conditions set forth in a mandatory development agreement could 
be construed as demands subject to the heightened scrutiny of Nol-
lan/Dolan.138  However, as long as entering into a development 
agreement is voluntary, conditions of the agreement will probably not 
be held as demands.139 
Third, a local government must make a developmental impact 
fee seem different from an individualized assessment on property.  
The more an impact fee appears to be directed toward a specific 
property, the more likely that the court will determine it to be a 
monetary exaction subject to the heightened standards of Nol-
lan/Dolan.140  Because of the potential for a particular fee or exaction 
being considered an exaction subject to Nollan/Dolan, some commu-
nities already go through the analysis of applying the takings tests to 
all new impact fees prior to imposing them.  That approach may be 
broader than necessary in most cases, but should discourage a devel-
 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-68-101-24-68-106; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3220-163.3243; HAW. 
REV. STAT. §§ 46-121-46-132; IDAHO CODE § 67-6511A; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.22; 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.0201; VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2303.1; N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55D-
45.2; MD. ANN. CODE §§ 24-301-24-311; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70B.170-36.70B.210; 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4352(8) (allowing, in Maine, “contract zoning” agree-
ments”). 
137 See Meredith v. Talbot Cnty., 560 A.2d 599, 604 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (holding 
that the developer was bound by the development agreement and could not invalidate it un-
der a claim of duress, because the developer made a “reasonable and informed business deci-
sion” which conferred benefits upon all the parties). 
138 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that while it is not clear 
what actually constitutes a demand, a mandatory development agreement would force devel-
opers to abide by the conditions of the agreement, which a court would likely construe as 
demands tied to the receipt of a permit and, therefore, subject to the Nollan/Dolan require-
ments). 
139 See Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696, 698-99 (9th Cir. 
1991) (holding that the takings analysis of Nollan/Dolan did not apply because the parties 
chose to execute a development agreement supported by consideration).  The court noted 
that “[s]uch a contractual promise which operates to restrict a property owner’s use of land 
cannot result in a ‘taking’ because the promise is entered into voluntarily, in good faith and 
is supported by consideration.”  Id.  The voluntary nature of the development agreement 
suggests that developers have negotiated a deal with a local government and are not having 
their land taken.  Id. 
140 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (stating that the “rough proportionality” test applies to “indi-
vidualized determination[s]” made by the local government on property).  The more a fee is 
tied to a specific property, the more likely it will be construed as an “individualized determi-
nation,” and subject to the Nollan/Dolan standards. 
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oper from bringing suit against a local government, and provide sup-
port to a local government if a lawsuit is filed to challenge the fee. 
Fourth, most commentators interpret Koontz to apply only to 
exactions imposed on a particular project, not to fees and exactions 
imposed through legislation.  A local government may be able to cir-
cumvent the heightened standards of Nollan/Dolan by imposing im-
pact fees and exactions through legislation, as these fees appear to be 
governed by the more deferential standard of Penn Central.141 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has become an in-
tegral part of American constitutional law, evolving over the course 
of a century to become an important guarantor of rights.  The doc-
trine has come to play a crucial role in the Court’s exactions jurispru-
dence, a controversial and changing area of law.  Developed largely 
in three landmark cases over the past three decades, the Court’s exac-
tions jurisprudence has become muddied by Koontz. 
Koontz raises many questions and answers few, and puts a 
veil of uncertainty over formerly clear standards.  One consequence 
of the decision that is clear, however, is that collaboration between 
local governments and developers will become more difficult.  Fear-
ful of lawsuits, local governments may be reluctant to negotiate with 
developers.  Emboldened by Koontz, developers may hold the threat 
of a lawsuit over local governments to extract conditions favorable to 
them.  Local governments and courts will struggle to determine the 
difference between a monetary exaction and a tax. 
In this new world, local governments must proceed with extra 
caution.  Although they can continue to negotiate with developers, 
they must take pains to create a record that shows they did not make 
demands, but rather engaged in an informal dialogue.  Local govern-
ments should consider making greater use of development agree-
ments, which might immunize them from liability during the negotia-
tion process and rebuild some of the trust lost in the wake of Koontz.  
With its indifference to practical realities, Koontz is reminiscent of a 
 
141 See id. (recognizing that the “rough proportionality” test applies to “individualized de-
terminations” made by the local government on property).  Since legislation cannot be an 
individualized determination, it would seem that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to it; there-
fore, Penn Central, which governs most regulatory takings, is the standard that would apply.  
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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Lochner Court decision, the Court that created the doctrine of uncon-




142 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14 
(1980) (noting that the Lochner Court decisions are “now universally acknowledged to have 
been constitutionally improper . . . .”). 
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